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A new approach has emerged in German innovation policy. The main novelty 
is that the allocation of pubic support is based on competition between 
initiatives for self-organized cooperation in Research and Development 
(R&D). In programs like BioRegio (Dohse, 2000, 2003), EXIST, InnoRegio 
(Eickelpasch, Kauffeld and Pfeiffer, 2002) and InnoNet (Belitz, 2003), a 
Federal Ministry invites local groups or ‘networks’ of actors to submit 
proposals for cooperative R&D projects with the prospect of attaining support 
for implementing the proposal. The submitted proposals are evaluated by a jury 
that selects those initiatives that appear to be most promising. The selected 
projects then receive public support. In most cases the actors of the competing 
initiatives are supposed to be located in a certain region. 
This paper provides a discussion of this new approach with its potential 
merits and demerits. Section 2 gives an outline of basic elements of the new 
approach. Section 3 deals with some justification of the new policy. Potential 
advantages, problems and limitations of allocating R&D subsidies by 
competition are outlined in section 4. Section 5 reviews the organization and 
the conditions of selected programs. Practical experiences with this kind of 
policy are reported in section 6. Final evaluation and conclusions of this new 
approach to technology policy follow in section 7. 
2.  Competition of concepts for innovative labor division: the basic 
approach 
Since the mid-1990s German innovation policy has increasingly applied 
competitive elements, particularly for a promotion of cooperative R&D 
(BMBF, 2002). The common aim of these new programs is to stimulate the 
division of innovative labor and thereby to mobilize potentials for innovation 
and creativity (BMWI, 1999). This is done by conducting a contest of concepts 
for the organization of cooperation within ‘networks’. In most of the programs 
the procedure consists of three steps:  
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•  Stage I: Groups of actors are invited to submit a proposal for a concept to 
organize cooperative innovation activity with the prospect of gaining a 
subsidy. The proposal has to show the future development of the 
technology and the relevance for market realization, the strengths of the 
regions and the participants and should make clear the chances of success. 
In most cases only a rough outline of the concept is required in the first 
stage. 
•  Stage II is selection of proposals for further elaboration and final funding. 
In most of the programs under review here, the selection of concepts was 
organized in two rounds. In a first round outline of concepts were called 
for. A selection of these concepts was invited to participate in a second 
round of the contest in which initial concepts had to be further elaborated. 
While there is no direct compensation for the effort of developing the initial 
first-round proposal, the elaboration of the second-round application is 
usually supported by advice and public funding. The final selection was 
then made from the more elaborated concepts that came out of this second 
round. 
•  Stage III is the realization of the proposals over a longer period of time. 
The second stage of the contest gives the administration the opportunity of 
providing custom-tailored support in developing the concept and maybe 
steering the application in a certain direction that is favored by the 
administration. 
In most of the contests that have been conducted so far only a relatively 
small share of initial applications have been selected for funding (see section 6 
for details). In quite a number of cases, however, the administration that had 
organized the initial contest or another public body has launched further 
programs – frequently again in form of a contest – that were specifically 
designed for losers of the initial competition. These follow-up programs may 
be regarded a fourth stage of the new approach.  
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3.  Foundations of the new program type 
There are three strands of argument that may provide a theoretical foundation 
for the policies under inspection here. One of these possible foundations is the 
recent approaches to explain innovation behavior, particular in a regional 
context (section 3.1). The second one is the theory of network-relationships 
that is mainly based on the notion of uncertainty and transaction cost (section 
3.2). And a third element of such a theoretical foundation could be the theory 
of regional systems competition (section 3.3). 
3.1  Theories of innovation behavior 
Innovation activity is characterized by a pronounced division of labor and there 
are indications that the intensity of labor division has increased considerably in 
the last few decades (Arora and Gambardella, 1994; Hagedoorn, 2002). This 
division of innovative labor tends to be considerably shaped by geography 
(Fritsch, 2004). One indication for the importance of location is the clustering 
of innovation activity found in many empirical studies.
1 Clustering suggests 
that there are agglomeration advantages at work that stimulate R&D (Enright, 
2003; Porter, 1998). Among the most important of these agglomeration 
advantages are a relatively high potential for face-to-face contacts within 
clusters, the presence of positive external effects (e.g., knowledge spillovers), 
easy access to research institutions as well as to differentiated input markets 
such as the labor market and the market for specialized services. All these 
factors may facilitate the generation and the transfer of knowledge which 
constitutes a key element of innovation activity. Another indication for a 
significant role of location for R&D is the evidence that the spread of new 
knowledge tends to be heavily concentrated around its source. Obviously, 
spatial proximity is of significant importance for such knowledge flows and is, 
                                                 
1 For empirical evidence see Audretsch and Feldman (1996a), Cooke (2002, 130-156), 
Baptista and Swann (1998), Feldman (1994), Porter (1998), Prevezer (1998), Scott (1996), 
Shohet (1998), Swann (1998).  
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therefore, conducive for a division of innovative labor that necessitates 
knowledge transfers between the parties involved. 
That innovation processes have a pronounced regional dimension implies 
that the quality of regional innovation systems may differ considerably. 
According to a simple centre-periphery paradigm that can be traced back to the 
work of Hägerstrand (1967) the level as well as the success or efficiency of 
innovation activity should be higher in the centre than in more remote areas or 
in regions characterized by a relatively low degree of agglomeration. However, 
there are numerous empirical examples of small clusters in remote areas with 
low population density where innovation activity is highly effective (Porter, 
1998; van der Linde, 2003). This suggests that only a fraction of the 
differences in the efficiency and the success of R&D can be attributed to the 
sheer size of an agglomeration or cluster. Accordingly, more recent approaches 
to a theory of regional innovation
2 share the common hypothesis, that the main 
factor for explaining the quality of regional innovation activity is not size or 
endowment but the level and the quality of interaction within and between 
regional innovation systems. This interaction may constitute an important 
vehicle for knowledge spillovers that constitute a necessary precondition for a 
division if innovative labor. Therefore, stimulating the division of innovative 
labor could be a promising starting point for a policy that aims at promoting 
regional R&D activity. 
3.2  Specific problems of labor division in R&D 
Although the establishment of exchange relationship may not be considered a 
bottleneck for labor division with regard to ‘normal’ production activity it 
could constitute a serious hurdle for interaction in the field of R&D (see Fritsch 
2001 for an overview). One reason why interaction for mutually beneficial 
                                                 
2 These recent approaches are the notion of innovation systems (cf. Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 
1993; Edquist, 1997), the concept of industrial districts (cf. Porter 1998 and the contributions 
in Pyke, Beccatini and Sengenberger, 1990), the network approach (cf. Camagni, 1991; 
Grabher, 1993), and the concept of “innovative milieux” (Crevoisier and Maillat, 1991; Ratti, 
Bramanti and Gordon, 1997).  
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division of innovative labor may be difficult to establish is that relationships in 
R&D processes can not be completely specified since the result of an 
innovation process is unknown in advance. Because such incomplete contracts 
include the danger of the exchange partners behaving in an opportunistic way, 
establishing such relationships requires some trust. This implies that actors can 
not be completely anonymous to each other. They must be ‘linked’ (Kranton 
and Minehart, 2001), i.e. they have to spend some actor-specific transaction 
cost. This cost may be incurred while identifying a suitable transaction partner, 
when establishing an appropriate interface for the exchange relationship and/or 
by building up some reputation and trust in order to reduce the danger of 
opportunistic behavior to a reasonable level. 
Another reason why a division of innovative labor may necessitate 
investment in actor-specific transaction cost is that the required inputs are often 
highly specialized, and not commonly traded on large markets. Indeed, markets 
for skills and resources that are important for an innovation process may well 
be rather ’thin’ with only very few suppliers available and transactions taking 
place rather infrequently. Because suppliers are rare, an immense amount of 
search costs could be required for identifying a suitable transaction partner. 
Moreover, if only few transactions take place it may be hardly possible to 
identify a market price, so that negotiations about the conditions of an 
exchange tend to be rather costly. 
For these reasons, exchange relationships in the field of R&D require 
some actor-specific investment and, therefore, tend to be long-term and co-
operative in nature. If such cooperative relationship comes about it may have 
even more advantages than intensified division of innovative labor and 
increased efficiency of R&D processes. One such further advantage of R&D 
cooperation is that the relationships could involve relatively ‘open’ exchange 
of information that may be stimulating for R&D activity.
3 This can particularly 
pertain to the transfer of tacit knowledge that is not completely codified. 
                                                 
3 See for example Axelsson (1992), Lundvall (1993), and Powell (1990).  
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Therefore, cooperative relationship in R&D may work as an important medium 
for knowledge spillovers. Many authors suggest that not only formalized 
cooperative relationships like joint ventures or contract research are important 
for such knowledge spillovers, but that informal relationships like “information 
trading” (reciprocal exchanges of information between personnel of competing 
firms) often play a significant role for stimulating innovation activity (e.g., von 
Hippel, 1987; Saxenian, 1994). 
Because mutually beneficial modes of labor division in the field of R&D 
do not emerge more or less automatically, it may be promising for innovation 
policy to support the establishment of such cooperative relationship. This 
pertains to formalized relationship as well as to rather informal types of 
interaction that may be conducive for innovation processes. The appropriate 
means for stimulating interaction within regional innovation systems are, 
however, largely unclear. This pertains particularly to stimulation of the more 
informal modes of interaction and exchange. 
3.3 Systems  competition 
Problems and regions may have specific characteristics so that a centrally 
designed one-size-fits-it-all-approach does not represent the best possible 
answer. Therefore, variety may be required for obtaining appropriate solutions 
that work sufficiently well. Yet if different ways to approach a certain problem 
or to organize certain activities exist, competition between the alternative 
means may help to identify the best solution. Moreover, competition could fuel 
the search for the most efficient and appropriate approach. It may particularly 
stimulate the imitation and diffusion of superior solutions. This is a key 
argument in the theory of federalism or, more generally, systems competition 
(Frey and Eichenberger, 1999; Vanberg and Kerber, 1994). 
A basic precondition for such competition is variety. There should be 
room for different solutions to emerge. This implies that political programs are 
designed in an way that leave the actors sufficient degrees of freedom that 
allow them to develop the problem solving methods they deem appropriate to  
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their particular needs. In case of policies at a regional level this should 
particularly be the case because regional actors tend to know the specific 
problems in their region much better than actors at a central level. One could, 
therefore, expect that decentralized innovation policies, e.g. operated at a 
regional level, should be more appropriate than a completely centralized 
approach. Due to variety of approaches, competition can be expected to have a 
stimulating effect on the search for adequate solutions. With regard to regional 
innovation systems or networks, the definition of what is the respective region 
must not necessarily follow administrative criteria but could be specific and 
account for the locations of all the relevant actors (Frey and Eichenberger, 
1999). Therefore, a policy that is aiming at stimulating regional innovation 
systems may leave the delineation of the respective region to the respective 
actors. 
In summarizing the arguments that were briefly reviewed in this section, 
there are good grounds to suggest a decentralized approach to innovation 
policy that tries to stimulate the diverse kinds of innovative labor division. The 
theory of federalism or systems competition proposes to leave main degrees of 
freedom with regard to the design of such a policy to a lower level. There are 
strong arguments to expect that competition of different solutions could help to 
identify the superior alternative. Competition may also stimulate imitation and 
diffusion of the best suited solutions. 
4.  Advantages and disadvantages of the contest approach 
The programs under review have a number of important advantages over 
conventional innovation promotion measures. These possible merits of the new 
approach are explicated in section 4.1. We then deal with possible 
disadvantages (section 4.2) and limitations (section 4.3). Our point of reference 
for identifying the merits and demerits of the new approach is the common 
practice of allocating financial support to submitted applications that fulfill the 
requirements of a certain program. If any judgments have to be made, 
particularly if the program includes discretionary elements, the decisions are  
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made case-by-case. They are not based on a comparison and a ranking of all 
submitted applications like in a contest. 
4.1 Advantages 
Compared to the standard procedure of allocating R&D support the new type 
of program provides a whole number of advantages. 
•  Self-organizing the division of innovative labor: One main advantage of the 
approach is that applicants have certain degrees of freedom in choosing the 
organizational form of innovative labor division that appears appropriate to 
them. Hence, policy makers largely avoid the pretence of knowledge-
problem. The degrees of freedom that applicants have for the design of 
their project is in the very nature of the approach because if all submissions 
were identical a contest would not make any sense. Because the applicants 
are designing the relevant network by themselves, they also give a 
definition of the extent, e.g. the regional dimension of the network. 
Therefore, no predetermined delineation according to administrative 
criteria is necessary as would be the case in a program in which the 
availability of funds is limited to certain assisted areas that may be too 
small to include all relevant actors or sources of knowledge spillovers. 
Hence, there must not be any artificial discrimination against certain 
potential members of the network due to administrative criteria.
4 
•  Mobilization of innovative potential: A further important advantage of the 
contest approach is that it can generate relatively strong mobilization 
effects. Due to the considerable freedom that a contest leaves regarding the 
design of cooperation, it may stimulate actors to figure out how a new form 
of innovative labor division could be organized or in which way the 
existing forms could be improved. The competition approach is, therefore, 
                                                 
4 However, some spatial restrictions may apply. In most of these programs partners located 
far away from the network-‘core’ were not eligible for funding. In the InnoRegio program, for 
example, funding was limited to actors located in East Germany. And as a general restriction of 
German innovation policy, financial support is not granted to actors located abroad.  
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more likely to stimulate creativity and the generation of ideas than 
conventional assistance policy. This may be particularly relevant in regions 
with a relatively low level of innovation activity where conventional 
programs for stimulating R&D find only few occasions for funding and 
can, therefore, have an only limited effect. 
•  Quality enhancing effects of interregional competition: The general 
expectation that competition generates incentives for a high level of 
performance may also hold for the concepts submitted in a contest. This 
competition is considerably more pronounced than in a conventional 
program with case-by-case decisions because all applications are compared 
at a certain time. 
•  Learning effects for applicants: The selection procedure may induce 
learning processes. Even if the information output of the selection 
procedure is just a “yes” or “no”-decision, this entails the information that 
the proposal was good enough or not good enough to meet the relevant 
requirements. If the feedback contains more information such as comments, 
demands for alterations etc. this may lead to considerable learning 
processes on the side of the applicants. The more profound and detailed the 
feedback for applicants on their proposal the higher the potential learning 
effects. This can be relevant for all kinds of applicants, winners and losers. 
The intensity and the quality of the feedback depend critically on the 
implementation and management of the contest. 
•  Selection quality: The contest approach makes it much easier to allocate 
R&D funding to the most promising projects than is the case with a 
conventional approach that is characterized by case-by-case decisions. In 
the conventional approach the administration decides according to the 
relevant rules and to budget constraints whether to grant funding or not 
whenever an application is submitted. It is a main characteristic of this 
conventional approach that, at the time a decision about funding is made, 
the administration does not know if later application will be of higher or 
lesser quality. This limits the possibilities of selecting the most promising 
projects considerably. The contest mode of selection is to decide about  
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subsidies at a time when all competing applications are known and can be 
taken into consideration in order to select the most promising ones. 
Therefore, selection decisions can be of higher quality because they are 
capable of more relevant information than the conventional approach of 
case-by-case decisions. And if decisions are made by an independent jury 
of experts the quality of the selection may also be higher as compared to 
decision by a public administration due to the superior expertise of the 
jury.
5 
•  Relatively high impact of public funds: Because it is in the very nature of a 
contest for R&D funding that not all applications will win and attain public 
assistance, the impact of the program in terms of mobilization of creativity 
and innovative potential could affect considerable more programs than are 
finally funded. Due to such a ‘mobilization surplus’ the impact of a contest 
may be particularly higher than for a conventional program of the same 
budget size which just reaches out subsidies. Hence, the public resources 
are probably spent more effectively than in conventional innovation 
promoting programs. 
•  Even losers may benefit: The mobilization surplus of the contest-type 
programs is closely connected with the benefits of losers. One of the 
potential benefits from participating in the contest that remains for those 
applications that were not selected is the concept that may constitute a basis 
for further action. Even if an initiative fails to gain public support actors 
may try to realize at least a part of their ideas without public support in one 
or the other way. Hence, even the losers in the competition may gain 
something. Also feedback on the submitted concept and contact that was 
established to potential cooperation partners while preparing the proposal 
may proof to be of future value. 
•  Learning effects for policy makers and public administration: In the contest 
approach, innovative actors must necessarily have considerable degrees of 
                                                 
5 For experiences with peer reviews see Sturm (2003).  
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freedom for designing their proposal. They can be expected to use these 
degrees of freedom for expressing their ideas that reflect their specific 
needs and desires. Policy makers and the public administration may, 
therefore, have good opportunity to learn so they are able to design more 
appropriate programs in the future. 
•  Publicity and transparency of decisions: As contests may be addressed to a 
wider group of potential applicants than conventional programs the 
decisions tend to be subject to much more attention and publicity. By that, 
the pressure for justification of decisions is higher and may induce a more 
transparent design of decision procedures. But also the opposite effect may 
occur that public pressure induces attempts to conceal the details of the 
decision process. 
4.2 Disadvantages 
Besides these possible merits of the contest approach to R&D incentives there 
may also be occur some of the following disadvantages as compared to 
conventional policy measures for stimulating innovation activity. 
•  Relatively high organizational effort for administration: Conducting a 
contest policy may well require much more time and resources than is 
needed for a conventional program. This may particularly hold if there is a 
jury involved in the selection procedure. 
•  Organizational effort for applicants: Not only policy makers but also 
applicants may have to spend more effort participating in a contest as 
compared to a case-to-case selection. The above mentioned quality 
enhancing effect of competition may require more resources for preparation 
of a promising application than in case of a conventional R&D subsidy. 
This may particularly hold if the application has to include not only an 
R&D project but also a concept for organizing the division of innovative 
labor in a network of actors, as is the case in many of the contest-type 
programs reviewed above. Developing a concept for joint R&D will 
necessitate the identification of potential partners, their selection and the  
 
12
ex-ante coordination of the project. If, however, only a rough outline is 
required in the first stage of the contest, the effort of application may be 
much smaller then in regular programs. 
•  Need of time for the contest: Conducting a contest may be more time-
consuming than administrating a conventional program of R&D subsidies. 
Therefore, time and first-mover advantages that otherwise could be used 
for starting and realizing the intended innovation project may be lost. 
•  Discouragement and discrimination of losers: If a contest has winners there 
are also losers. These losers may keep considerable benefits from 
participating in the contest (see section 4.1 above) but they could also find 
themselves ‘punished’ in several ways. First, although they could have 
learned something in the process of application, at least a part of their effort 
for the application procedure was in vain. Second, losers in the contest may 
suffer from bad reputation of not being selected. And third, because the 
‘winners’ in the contest get public support for their R&D, those firms that 
are not rewarded in this way have a competitive disadvantaged (Dohse 
2000). This could be especially dubious when the differences in the quality 
of concepts were not very significant. 
•  Relatively high administrative flexibility required: It constitutes a basic 
requirement of any contest that the participants have some degree of 
freedom in the design of their concepts. The search for concepts constitutes 
a discovery procedure the results of which can not be predicted. Therefore, 
the implementation of a winning concept may require new modes of 
support or administrative innovation and learning. While the respective 
administration may feel this pressure for more flexibility to be a 
disadvantage it could also be regarded an advantage from a broader 
perspective. 
•  Relatively high pressure on administration: We have argued that publicity 
pressure of the contest may lead to relatively high quality of the selection 
procedure. This pressure can be rather uncomfortable for the administration 
inducing attempts of avoidance.  
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4.3  Limitations of the approach 
The contest approach is, by its very nature, a ‘picking the winner’ procedure 
and is, therefore, not well suited as a means of policies that aim at leveling-out 
of welfare levels. Due to the distinct ‘picking the winner’-character of the 
approach it is rather unlikely that support goes to the less able applicants or the 
lagging regions. Therefore, the policy is likely to lead to an increase of welfare 
differences and not a decrease. The procedure would be perverted if used to 
pick the most needy applicants because in this case applicants would compete 
for the lowest-quality application. 
Limiting the competition to certain types of applicants or to a part of the 
country which is economically backwards (like the InnoRegio program that is 
limited to East Germany, see section 5 below) does in no way change this bias 
towards supporting the most promising initiatives. With a quality-oriented 
selection mechanism, nothing favors proposals that come from the most needy 
applicant or most lagging region. For supporting less favored initiatives or 
regions, other measures of a more enabling character must be found. 
4.4  Intermediate conclusions: implementation matters 
Compared to a conventional policy that allocates support on basis of case-by-
case decisions the contest approach has a number of advantages. Compared to 
these merits the demerits appear to be of less importance so that a positive net-
effect remains. It is a clear weakness of the contest approach that conducting 
such a contest may require considerable resources and that more time from 
application to receipt of funding may be needed than with a conventional 
policy. But the length of this period depends on the way the policy is 
implemented and managed. The same holds for a number of the advantages 
that depend critically on the administration of the program like selection 
quality, learning effects for the applicants and public administration. 
It is not quite clear from the conceptual point of view in how far the policy 
should care for the losers of the contest. We have argued that even the losers  
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may benefit from participating in the contest because they could try to use their 
ideas and maybe received valuable feedback during the procedure. Helping the 
loser could be regarded favorable if they would not be able to realize good 
ideas without public support. It could also appear reasonable if the quality of 
the winning and the loosing proposals is very close so that funding of winners 
only leads to considerable distortion of market competition. 
5.  The programs under review: a selective overview 
In this section we give an overview of the new type of German innovation 
policy program. These programs have two special characteristics. First, 
stimulating cooperation or networks as a way to strengthen the innovation 
potential of actors involved. And second, the supported initiatives are selected 
by means of a contest. Some of the programs are focused on a certain 
technological field; others are more general and have no such specific 
technological orientation. Most of the programs were initiated by the Ministry 
of Education and Research (BMBF). Only two of them have been launched by 
the Ministry of Economics and Labor (BMWA). It should be mentioned, that 
there are still other programs focused on R&D cooperation and innovative 
networks in operation which are not based on contests as a selection mode 
(e.g., the ProInno program). 
•  BioRegio was the first program of this type in Germany (Dohse, 2000). Its 
apparent success paved the way for other programs of this kind. The 
BioRegio program was launched by the BMBF in the year 1995 with the 
aim of strengthening German biotechnology industry and, thus, to catch up 
with the leading nations in this field, the US and the UK in particular. The 
BioRegio contest was designed to stimulate cooperation and division of 
innovative labor between private firms, universities, non-university 
research institutes, and venture capitalists in a certain region. Proposals for 
this program were required to outline the strengths of the regional 
biotechnology sector and to make propositions for its future development, 
particularly for research projects and the regional cooperation. The basic 
idea of this program dates back as far as to the early 1990’s. There were no  
 
15
restrictions with regard to the number of participants or the definition of the 
respective region. An independent international jury with representatives 
from science, industry and labor unions selected four winning initiatives 
according to a detailed list of  9 criteria provided by the ministry. The 
criteria by which the regions were picked out were the economic and 
research potential of the regions (companies, universities, research and 
supporting service facilities), the interregional interaction, the planned 
strategies (converting research results into new products, support of start-
ups, role of banks and of local authorities). The selection was completed 
November 1996. These regions obtained preferential access to federal 
funding of 90 Mill. Euro for the years 1997 to 2002 for realizing their 
proposed projects. In fact, due to late approval some projects will run until 
the end of the year 2005. 
Although there was no official complementary evaluative research for 
the BioRegio program it was soon regarded a promising success (Dohse 
2000). The widely acclaimed success of BioRegio worked as a main 
motivation for the setting up of other programs like BioProfile, BioChance, 
BioChancePLUS or BioFuture. In this connection also losers of BioRegio 
got a second chance for promotion. Most of the succeeding programs were 
contest-based as well. 
•  The BioProfile program started in November 1999 and drew some benefits 
from experiences of the BioRegio contest. Regions with high potential for 
commercialization of know-how in a self-defined field of biotechnology 
could apply for promotion. In phase 1 the regions were expected to develop 
their concept: defining their specific aims and the geographical extension of 
their network, identify the research institutes as well as the private firms to 
cooperate with, expose their expertise and the economic impact of the 
results to be expected. One of the partners had to act as the coordinator of 
the initiative. Applications were to be submitted until March 2000. 
According to the published guidelines for applicants up to 20 of the 
submitted applications were to be selected by an independent jury for 
further elaboration. This further elaboration was financially supported by  
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the ministry. In a second round of the contest, three out of the 20 
applications were selected for phase 3, which started in July 2001. In the 
course of five years the winning regions are promoted for realizing their 
proposed research projects. 
•  The BioFuture program, implemented in the year 1999, was also based on 
the BioRegio experiences. The aim of this program is to stimulate basic 
research in biosciences and to enhance the career prospects of already 
experienced high qualified young scientists. Public supported is granted to 
research projects conducted by groups of young German or foreign 
scientists hosted by German universities or non-university research 
institutions. In this program an initial project outline has to be submitted 
that is evaluated by an independent jury. The selected proposals are invited 
for a second round in which the proposal has to be elaborated supported by 
some financial funding. The jury as well as external experts evaluate the 
application. The program is scheduled until the year 2010.
6 
•  The aim of the EXIST program that was introduced in December 1997 is to 
improve the knowledge transfer between universities and the commercial 
sector by promoting entrepreneurship and encouraging start-ups of students 
and personnel
7. In its initial form the EXIST program invited for proposals 
of concepts to stimulate new firm formation out of universities. These 
proposals were supposed to entail cooperation between universities and 
other actors in the respective region. EXIST sponsors activities in networks 
to improve the climate for start-ups at universities and to motivate, train 
and support entrepreneurial personalities, students, employees and 
graduates. The networks consist of universities and at least two external 
partners like institutions of the academic community, private enterprises or 
chambers of commerce and associations. Each network is funded with 
about 1 Mill. Euro for three years. The contest consisted of two steps. First, 
                                                 
6 For further information concerning the three programs see URL http://www.bioregio.com  
7 For further information see Kulicke (2003) and URL http://www.exist.de.  
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a project outline had to be submitted. An independent jury with 
representatives from the academic community, the business and the finance 
sector selected those proposals that were invited to submit a more 
elaborated concept. The jury also acts as a board of experts that 
accompanies the whole program. 
Table 1: Selected contest oriented programs in support of regional R&D co-
operation in Germany  


























private firms & 
public research 
institutes  
X X   




Private firms & 
public research 
institutes 
X X   
1999 - 2006  50 mill.  2  jury 







X    
1999 - 2010  75 mill.  2  jury 
“EXIST” regional 
cooperation 
at least three 
partners thereof 
one university 
 X  X 






at least three 
partners thereof 
one university 
 X  X 
2002 - 2005  10 mill.  2  jury 
“InnoRegio” regional 




private firms & 
public research 
institutes  X X X 
1999 - 2006  253 mill. 2  jury 
“NEMO“* cooperation  in 
R&D 
private SMEs & 
public research 
institutes 
 X  X 
2002 - 2006   3 mill.  2  ministry 
“InnoNet” *  cooperation in 
R&D 
private SMEs & 
public research 
institutes 
X    


















X X   
2000 - 2006  118 mill. 2  steering 
committee
* Sponsored by the BMWA, all the others by the BMBF. ** Planned/ used until end of 2003.  
sme: small and medium-sized enterprises. pri: publicly funded research institutes. 




•  The EXIST-Transfer program is rather similar to the initial EXIST program 
program. Applicants (universities) had to submit their proposals until the 
end of January 2002. The concepts should show in how far the initiative 
utilizes experiences from the initial EXIST program. At the end of March 
2002 the applications for the second round of the selection procedure were 
recommended by an independent jury. As a result of this second round ten 
regions were selected for the implementation phase which began in June 
2002 and lasts for about three years.  
•  The InnoRegio program was launched by the BMBF in April 1999. The 
aim of the program was to strengthen innovative and economic 
competitiveness in selected regions of East Germany, that part of the 
country that had been under socialist regime until 1990. The contest 
requested concepts for regional innovation networks. The InnoRegio 
program was limited to East Germany but not to certain industries or 
technologies. Besides the restriction to East Germany the spatial 
delineation of regions participating in the contest was not in any way pre-
determined. Prospective participants from numerous professional areas like 
science, business, education, administration etc. were invited to enter the 
competition for promotional funds by submitting concepts for the 
development of regional innovation networks. The winning proposals were 
chosen in two rounds. The program’s initial request for proposals explicitly 
stated that a maximum number of 50 concepts will be chosen for the 
second round of the selection procedure and that a maximum of 25 will 
finally gain funding in the third stage. 
The initial qualification phase ran from April to October 1999, when 
applying regional network initiatives put forward their first concepts. In 
November 1999 an independent jury chose those 50 proposals that were 
included in the second round of the contest. Main criteria for this selection 
were the importance of the network for the region, complementarities of 
participants in the proposed network and the innovative quality of the 
planned R&D. Those  network initiatives that were selected for the second 
stage of the contest were awarded up to about 153,400 Euro per initiative  
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for preparing a more detailed version of their concept. In this second round 
the InnoRegio-initiatives were also provided with immaterial support from 
the Ministry in form of moderators who monitored the communication and 
organization process as well as with free consultancy on subject areas and 
technical aspects of the promotion. The elaborated concepts had to be 
submitted by the end of June 2000. In October 2000 the jury decided on 
further promotion and selected 25 concepts for realization in the third stage. 
In this third stage of the program, the Ministry provides financial assistance 
of overall 253 mill. Euro over a period of five years (from the end of the 
year 2000 to the end of 2006). Activities eligible for funding are R&D 
projects as well as qualification measures conducted by private firms, 
universities and other public research institutes jointly or on their own. In 
addition, the management of the network is supported financially.
8 
InnoRegio was the first initiative in a whole string of initiatives aiming 
at improving regional innovative networks in the new Länder. The program 
“Interregionale Allianzen für die Märkte von morgen“ supports regional 
networks during the phase of constituting, the program “Regionale 
Wachtumskerne” started in 2001 as a program similar to InnoRegio, and 
the program “Zentren für Innovationskompetenz” promotes since 2002 the 
international co operation of universities.   
•  In 1999 the Ministry of Economics and Labor (BMWA; by then Ministry 
of Economics and Labor) launched the InnoNet program that was aiming at 
promoting joint projects between small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs) and public research institutes (like Fraunhofer institutes). At least 
two institutes and four SMEs should be involved into the joint project, 
which has to be coordinated by a research institute. There are no 
restrictions in terms of type of technology or the regional dimension of the 
network. Those proposals that receive public funding in the InnoNet 
program are selected in two rounds. In the first round the administration 
                                                 




evaluates the rough project outlines submitted. In a second round the 
selected projects are asked to elaborate a more detailed application. Within 
three months an independent jury consisting of national representatives of 
universities, research institutes, companies and associations (no members 
of the Ministry) decides on the promotion of the applied projects. The 
program is terminated the end of 2005
9. 
•  NEMO (Netzwerk Management Ost) was started by the BMWA in 
February 2002. The program is aiming at promoting the development and 
organization of SME networks mainly in East Germany. A network in the 
sense of this program consists of at least six small and medium sized 
companies as well as public research institutes aiming at specific self-
defined technology fields(e.g. research and development, 
commercialization of research output). The program is restricted to 
networks in East Germany. The program provides support of network 
management that has to be co-financed by the network partners. 
•  The program kompetenznetze.de was introduced in 1998 with two goals. 
First, providing and presenting internet–based information about innovative 
(mostly regional) networks in Germany. And second, to support networks 
by providing a platform for communication and information as well as by 
offering workshops and conferences on issues relevant for the network 
managers. There is no further funding. Applications can be submitted twice 
a year. An advisory board consisting of eight members from science, 
industry and the German chamber of commerce evaluates the applications 
and decides about funding
10. 
•  The BMBF-program Lernende Regionen (learning regions) started in 
October 2000 and supports the building and maintenance of regional 
networks for education and learning. Members of networks can be schools 
                                                 
9 For further information see URL http://www.forschungskoop.de and http://www.vdi-vde-
innonet.de  
10 For further information see URL http://www.kompetenznetze.de   
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and other education institutions, training companies and social or cultural 
organizations. Until 2006 a volume of 118 mill. Euro has been set aside for 
this program. There are two steps of promotion. The first is a planning 
phase of one-year. In a second step, the realization of the project can be 
funded for a period of up to four year if the first phase is evaluated 
positively. Applicants are selected not by an independent jury but by a 
steering committee consisting of members of the ministry and 
representatives of the administration of all Länder.
11 
In all these programs, no subsidy or compensation was given for preparing 
the proposal that was initially submitted. 
6.  Experiences with contests: some preliminary evidence 
In this section we report experiences made with the contest approach in 
German innovation policy. The available evidence on the effects of the 
programs is still rather limited, mainly, because most of the programs are still 
in operation so that there is no ex-post evaluation possible. In addition, most of 
the programs were not subject to any complementary evaluative research. Up 
to the present, BioRegio is the only example of this program type that has been 
officially completed. Although, there is no detailed final assessment of its 
effects available
12, this program is deemed rather successful (Dohse 1998, 
Cooke 2002). 
Incentive for self-organization: When initiatives submit their proposal to 
the administration they have already made the first important step towards self-
organizing their future division of labor and building a regional network. For 
the InnoRegio program this effect can be demonstrated using data of an inquiry 
of successful initiatives that have been selected for funding. Participants of the 
                                                 
11 For further information see URL http://www.lernende-regionen.info/dlr/index.php 
12 The Federal Ministry of Education and Research did not support any complementary 
evaluation for the BioRegio program. In the case of EXIST, InnoRegio and InnoNet such 
complementary evaluation was implemented at an early stage of the program.  
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winner regions were asked whether they did cooperate with their InnoRegio 
partners before the application procedure and whether they knew each other 
(figure 1). Only a minority of 5 percent of the participants had cooperative 
relationship with most of the partners (categories: “many” 4 percent  and “all” 
1 percent) before the contest, while nearly one fifth of the partners (19 percent) 
did not cooperate with any of the partners of the InnoRegio network 
(“nobody”). However, 68 percent had cooperative relationship with “some” of 
the InnoRegio partners before. As could be expected the share of partners who 
knew each other before is higher: About one fifth (22 percent) of them knew 
“many” (19 percent) or “all” (3 percent) of the partners involved while only 5 
percent knew none of them. According to these results there can be no doubt 
that the InnoRegio contest had some considerable mobilizing effect on self-
organization of the network. 
 
Figure 1: Relationship of InnoRegio partners before participating the contest 
(percentage) 
 
Mobilization of innovative potential: Another indicator for the 
obilization effect of a program is the number of applications submitted in the 
cont be 
ional 























Source: DIW Berlin, Survey in 2000, N=727. 
m
est. The number or the share of non-successful applications can 
regarded as indicating mobilization “surplus”, i.e. induced initiatives that are 
not funded. For the first contest realized by the BMBF, BioRegio, 17 reg 
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networks applied for promotion and only four of them, about a quarter, were 
selected for further promotion (table 2). In many of the succeeding programs 
the mobilization surplus was much higher: 30 regions applied for BioProfile2
of them were accepted for the second round of the contest and three regions 
finally received funding. In BioFuture 43 grants were awarded in five different 
contests. The EXIST contest was realized at the end of 1997. All in all, only 
percent of the applications were successful. The number of 109 applications to 
the EXIST program shows a much higher mobilization effect than for the 
BioRegio program with only 17 submission. The reason for that may be that 
EXIST was not restricted to a specific technological field and thus attractiv
for a greater number of potential applicants. The largest program, both in term
of financial volume (250 mill. Euro) as well as with regards to the number of 
submissions is InnoRegio. The number of 444 applications to the InnoRegio 
contest can be judged a big success in terms of mobilization effect, particularly
because the contest was restricted to East Germany. In the InnoRegio program
the share of applications that were finally granted is quite low. Only 25 out of 
444 applications were successful. Two of them failed in the course of time, so 
that as the end of  2003 only 23 networks are still part of the InnoRegio 
program. The share of the mobilization surplus amounts to about 95 percent. 
However, most of the other programs had higher winners quotas (table 3
sum up, the contests conducted so far had a considerable mobilization effect. I
most of these programs the mobilization surplus, i.e. the applications that 
finally did not receive funding was more than 70 percent. One may well 
presume that this mobilization surplus effect is at least as important as the 
funding of the winners. This supposition can, however, hardly be proven 
empirically. Until the end of 2003 in the program “Lernende Regionen” tw
contests were conducted, one in June 2000, one in April 2000. In the first 
round 54 out of 250 applications were selected for the planning phase, in the 
second round 27 out of 100. Some of them failed in the second phase of 
qualifying the proposal. Thus, at the end of 2003 only 72 instead of 81 region













Table 2: Applications for selected Contest oriented programs in support of 
regional innovation co-operation in Germany (as of end 2003) 




















BioRegio 1  1995  17  4  76 
BioProfile 1  1999  30  3  90 
BioFuture 5  1999,  2000, 
2001, 2002, 
2003 
n.a 43   
EXIST 1  1997  109  5  95 
EXIST Transfer  1  2002  45  10  78 
InnoRegio  1  1999 to 2000  444  23  95 
NEMO 3  2002,  2003  209  55  73 
InnoNet 5  1999,  2000, 
2001, 2002, 
2003 
404 51  87 
kompetenznetze.de 8  n.a.  n.a.  n.a  40 
Lernende Regionen  2  2000, 2001  350  72  79 
Source: Own compilation. 
 
Need of time: The period between the call for submissions for the contest 
and the first transfer of funds varies between the different programs. Compared 
to the case-by-case decision on funding additional time is needed for 
conducting the contest. For example, the BioRegio contest lasted about one 
year. In the EXIST-program the contest also took about 12 months. In EXIST 
Transfer about five months were required, in InnoRegio the time fort he contest 
was 20 months and in InnoNet one year. It is not all easy to assess the effects 
of the additional time needed for the contest compared to decisions made on a 
case-by-case basis. For BioRegio participants interregional competition is 
despite the time needed viewed as a appropriate selection mode. Not only the 
winners but also the losers made that statement (Dohse 2000). In contrast, the 
InnoRegio contest participants complained in the early stage of the process 
about the complex and long lasting decision procedure (Eickelpasch, Kauffeld 
and Pfeiffer 2002). Especially those participants who planned to realize high-
tech projects were afraid to lose important first-mover advantage over of the 
long-lasting selection period. In InnoNet similar complaints were expressed. It 
was argued that a contest period of one year is too long with regard to short 
innovation cycles in the technological fields concerned (Belitz, Pfirmman,  
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Eschenbach 2002). It was recommended to shorten the contest to a period of 
half a year. 
Learning effects for policy makers and administration: The administration 
obviously used the experiences made in the contests for the improvement of 
their programs in different ways. For example, the BioRegio program was – 
when it was proved to be successful – followed by some other programs also 
focusing on biotechnology, partly as contests. Thus, the contests BioFuture as 
similar to BioRegio and BioFuture benefited from the experiences of 
BioRegio. In addition, other programs like BioChance and BioChancePlus
13 
were implemented. Similarly, the EXIST Transfer contest as well as the 
EXIST-Partner-program are to be seen as successor programs of EXIST, which 
were built on the experiences made. The experiences gained in the 
implementation of InnoRegio were transferred to the Wachstumskerne-
program. In the InnoNet program that was designed as a program with several 
contests the administration could cut down the length of the contest period 
considerably (Beelitz, Pfirrmann and Eschenbach 2002). 
Discouragement of losers: It is quite obvious that those who lost the 
contests may be frustrated at first hand and thus the propensity that initiatives 
will be abandoned is quite high. In general, the initiatives which lost the 
contest may be divided into two groups, those who are still active after a 
certain period of time trying to realize their concept - at least partly - and those 
who are not. There is only limited empirical evidence in how far losers are 
discouraged or not. In the EXIST contest 109 proposals were submitted in the 
first step, 105 of them were not selected for further funding. Three years after 
the selection of the winners was made, a study by Krantz, Lilischkis and 
Wessels (2000) investigated what happened to the EXIST initiatives that did 
not receive funding. 79 percent of the 47 contest-losers that were included in 
the study were realizing their project, mostly in a modified way. The 
                                                 
13 The aim of the BioChance program which started in 1999 was to support young firms 
(not older than five years) by co-financing market-oriented high-risk R&D projects in the field 
of biotechnology. BioChancePlus as the successor program started in 2003.  
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realization was partly financed by the federal states (Bundesländer), partly 
financed by private investors. In the first phase of the InnoRegio contest 416 
applicants lost. In 2000 210 initiatives were still active, 96 were not longer 
active (mostly because of lack of financing) whereas for 110 initiatives no 
information is available (figure 2). Four years after the contest at least 22 
initiatives were still exiting and in the phase of realizing their proposals, partly 
financed by private investors partly funded by the federal or the federal 
government. The complementary research of the InnoNet program asked the 
applicants for their evaluation of the contest realized. According to the results 
most of the applicants agreed with the selection procedure, both winners as 
well as by the losers. The main reason for the positive evaluation was, that 
there were two phases of application which reduced the effort for application in 
the course of the first round and made it possible to be eventually consulted by 
the administration in the course of the second round (Belitz, Pfirmman and 
Eschenbach 2002). To conclude, it can be stated, that the discouragement effect 
of contest for losers is not as high as could be expected: Some of the initiatives 
pursue their initial aims, but it is also quite clear that – not surprisingly – for 
the realization of the concepts further funding is necessary.  
Figure 2: Development of the InnoRegio-initiatives of 1999 (as of December 
31, 2003) 








12345 2000 2001 2002 2003 1999
no further information
no longer active




To allocate R&D subsidies by means of a competition has many advantages. 
One of these advantages is the chance to generate relatively strong 
mobilization effects and, therefore, a high impact of public funds. Another 
merit is a relatively low level of pretence of knowledge that may be associated 
with this kind of policy. The degrees of freedom that actors have with regard to 
the design of their projects may induce considerable learning effects on the side 
if the applicants as well as for policymakers. The openness of the approach 
gives policy makers a good opportunity to learn about the needs and 
requirements of their clientele and to include these experiences in the design of 
other programs. And competition for funding may have quality enhancing 
effects on the design of the concepts that are submitted. The main disadvantage 
of this policy approach is the additional time needed for the conducting a 
dures should operate quickly so that applicants do not 
loose too much of an early-mover advantage. And, as a ‘picking the winner’-
approach contests are not suited as a means of a leveling-out policy that is 
ohesion. 
In the future, contests will probably be of growing importance for German 
innovation policy, as official statements indicate (Blum 2001, BMBF 2002). 
Further research will be needed to investigate thoroughly the effectiveness of 
contests for innovation policy. A main focus of this research should be on the 
implementation of the programs because this issue appears to be of crucial 
importance for the advantages of the approach to become effective. 
contest. Contest proce
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